XXIX. CALLIPPUS (Pamphilus) 1. Isocr. 15, 93: 廒反徆帢彖怷 弮廔統 怷廔彖 廒彖 怷庣 廔彖怷弮 弮怷庣 庥帢廔 庣庛庰巹帤庢 庥帢廔 峎弇弇庣怷 弇庢庣峎庤庰庣彖. Idem Callippus nominari videtur Demosth. 7, 42, cf. Schol. 彃用晅 廒缶 廒庛庢彖帢彃怷. 2. Aristot. rhet. 1399 a 10: 廒弇弇怷 (sc. 怷 彃僇 帢庣彖怷弮峟彖彖 廒彖庛弮庢弮峎彖), 廒庰庣帤廔 廒廔 彃僇 弇庰巹彖 弮帣帢巹彖庰庣 廔甩庰 廒庰庛帢巹 庣 彃 帢廔彃 廒帠帢庛廔裕 庥帢廔 庥帢庥彖, 廒庥 怷彃 廒庥怷弇怷庛怷彃缶誕怷 怷峟庰庣彖 廒 廒怷峟庰庣彖 庥帢廔 庥帢庢帠怷庰彃彖 廒 廒怷弇怷帠庰彃庛帢庣 庥帢廔 廒帢庣彖庰彃彖 廒 峟帠庰庣彖, 5 怷廒煎諺 彃 帢庣帤庰庰庣 廔 庛怷彖庰彃庛帢庣 廒庥怷弇怷庛庰彃 庥帢庥彖, 廔 帤廔 怷廔裕 庰廒僇諄敖 廒帠帢庛彖. 怷廔 怷巹彖彖 帤庰彃 帢庣帤庰庰庛帢庣, 庛怷彖庰彃庛帢庣 帠廔區 怷廔 帤庰彃. 帤庰彃 弮廔統 怷廔彖 帢庣帤庰庰庛帢庣, 怷廔裕 帠廔區 庰廒僇諄敖 帤庰彃, 廔 怷 怷廔 廒庣彖 廒 帢弇弇巹怷 峟彖庢, 怷弇帢帣怷彃羊帢 廔 帤彖帢廔裕 庥帢廔 廒弇弇帢, 廔＋ 庰廒區峸庰帢庣. 8. 9 廔＋ 庰廒棲庢帢庣 ll. cf. infra 4.
3. Aristot. rhet. 1399 a 18: 廒弇弇怷, 廔帢彖 庰廔 帤怷彃彖 庥帢廔 廒彖庣庥庰庣弮峟彖怷庣彖 廒 怷峟庰庣彖 廒 廒怷峟庰庣彖 帤峟庢, {庥帢廔開 彃 庰怷彖 庰廒區庢弮峟彖彃 彃 廒宎 廒弮怷彃彖 彃庛帢庣. 帤庣帢峟庰庣 帤峟, 廔庣 廒庥庰彃 弮廔統 廔 彖帢 廒彖庣巹庛庰帢庣, 廒彖帢彃缶裕 帤廔 廒彖帢彖巹帢. 怷廒煎諺 廒敖倔庰庣帢 怷廔庥 庰廒棒 廔裕 5 廒晨螂彖 帤庢弮庢帠怷庰彃彖繚 廒廔匿 弮廔統 帠峎, 廒庢, 廔 帤巹庥帢庣帢 弇峟帠彃, 怷廒 廒彖庛怷巹 庰 弮庣峸怷庣彖, 廒廔匿 帤廔 廔 廒帤庣庥帢, 怷廒 庛庰怷巹. 帤庰彃 弮廔統 怷廔彖 帤庢弮庢帠怷庰彃彖繚 廒廔匿 弮廔統 帠廔區 廔 帤巹庥帢庣帢 弇峟帠彃, 怷廒 庛庰怷巹 庰 庣弇峸怷庣彖, 廒廔匿 帤廔 廔 廒帤庣庥帢, 怷廒 廒彖庛怷庣. 怷彃羊怷 帤宎 廒廔 帢廔廔 彃 弇庰帠怷弮峟彖彃 廔 廒弇怷 巹帢庛帢庣 庥帢廔 怷廔磁 廒弇帢. 庥帢廔 廒 帣弇帢巹庣 怷彃羊 廒庣彖, 廔帢彖 帤怷彃彖 10 廒彖帢彖巹怷庣彖 廒庥帢峟彃 廒帠帢庛廔裕 庥帢廔 庥帢庥廔裕 廒庢帢庣, 廒彖帢彖巹帢 廒庥峎庰帢 廒庥帢峟怷庣. 3 彃 codd. Hic locus cum antecedente tam arcte cohaeret, ut ab eodem Callippo elaboratus videatur.
4. Aristot. rhet. 1399 b 31: 廒弇弇怷 庥怷庣彖廔裒 庥帢廔 怷彃 廒弮庣帣庢怷彃羊庣彖 庥帢廔 怷彃 弮帣怷弇庰怷庣, 庥怷庰彃彖 廔 怷峟怷彖帢 庥帢巹 廒怷峟怷彖帢 庥帢廔 廔形 廒彖庰庥帢 庥帢廔 峎怷庣 庥帢廔 庰帠怷庣彖. 帢彃羊帢 帠廔區 廒庣彖, 廒 廒廔匿 弮廔統 廔峎彃, 帤庰彃 峎庰庣彖, <廒廔匿 帤廔 弮廔 廔峎彃, 弮廔 峎庰庣彖,> 怷廒煎諺 庰廒 帤彖帢廔裕 庥帢廔 彃丟噹帤庣怷彖 庥帢廔 廔峟弇庣弮怷彖 廒 帢廔彃 廒 巹弇怷庣 廒 帣弇帢帣庰廔裕 廒庛怷彃, 庥廒彖 廒庣庤峸弮庣怷彖 彄, <庰廒> 廒弇峎彖 廒 庤庢弮巹帢 怷彃 峎帠弮帢怷. 庥帢廔 怷峟怷庣 帤宎 廒庥 怷彖 庥帢廔 廒怷峟怷庣彖 廒庥 彃僇 廒彖帢彖巹彖, 廒庥 帤廔 彃僇 帢廔彃僇 怷彖 庥帢廔 庥帢庢帠怷怷彃羊庣 庥帢廔 廒怷弇怷帠怷彃缶誕帢庣, 廒庥 弮廔統 彃僇 廒怷庰彖彖 廒怷弇怷帠怷彃缶誕帢庣, 廒庥 帤廔 彃僇 10 怷庰彖彖 庥帢庢帠怷怷彃羊庣彖. 廒庣 帤宎 廔 怷 怷廔怷 廔弇庢 峟彖庢 廒 庰 帢弮巹弇怷 庥帢廔 廒 帢弇弇巹怷. 1 庥帢廔 廒庣庤峸弮庣怷彖 廒 2 怷峟怷彖帢庣 廒怷峟怷彖帢庣 Alius est Pamphilus quem laudat Quint. inst. 3, 6, 34, de Ciceronis Pamphilo rhetore (de orat. 3, 21, 81) non constat. Callippi non artem scriptam intellegi, sed ea artificia, quae in orationibus adhibuerat, Spengel ad Ar. rhet. p. 317 iudicavit, argumentis futilibus usus. Quis credat illas 峟彖帢, quales singuli sophistae edebant, semper totam artem rhetoricam exhausisse? Immo Callippi exemplum docet singula inventa interdum ese arte elaborata, illustrata. Ceterum vide, qua ratione auctor ad Her. 2, 2, 3 廔 庰廒匿磁 interpretetur: probabile est, per quod probatur expedisse peccare et ab simili turpitudine hominem numquam afuisse. Id dividitur in causam et in vitam. Causa est ea, quae induxit ad maleficium commodorum <spe aut incommodorum> vitatione, cum quaeritur, num quod commodum maleficio appetierit, num honorem, num pecuniam, num dominationem.宎 Quibus in verbis tota 怷彃 庰廒匿磁怷 doctrina Callippi praecepto tamquam altero pede videtur niti. Neque vero discipulum non agnosces Isocratis 15, 217 docentis: 彃剿怷彖 弮廔統 怷廔彖 廔巹帢庛帢庣 帤庰彃, 巹彖彖 廒庰帠弮庰彖怷庣... 怷弇弮彃剿巹 庣彖庰 廒帤庣庥庰彃彖... 廒帠廔 弮廔統 怷廔彖 廒﹡棒諺賦 廒 庥峟帤怷 廒 庣弮彃 廒彖庰庥帢 庢弮廔 峎彖帢 峎彖帢 峎庰庣彖. 廒徆 帠廔區 怷彖 怷廔帤庰弮巹帢彖 廒庣庛弮巹帢彖 廔彃 怷彃 廒彖庛怷庣 廒帠帠庣帠彖怷弮峟彖庢彖.
5. Philod. rhet. I p. 196. C怷l. XV a 3 S.: 彖廔 庣 廒弇弇廔 庢弮怷庛峟彖庢 庥帢廔 彃剿怷彖 廒弇庰帠庰 庥帢廔 帤庰庰怷彖 庥帢廔 巹怷彖 庰廒僇諄敖 廔棒 廔庥巹庣彖 廒彖 [彃 彃用煙怷]庣庥彃, 帢弇弇庣巹[帤庢 帤]廔 庥帢廔 庰庣庥帢怷 廒帠廔 峸 廔 彄僇 廒彖 帢帠帤巹彄喇
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XXIX. Callippus (Pamphilus) 1. Isocrates 15.93: Among the first to begin studying with me were Eunomus, Lysitheides, and Callippus. The same Callippus seems to be named in Demosth. 7.42, cf. Schol.: He was an Athenian orator. 2. Aristotle, Rhetoric 2.23 1399a11-18: Again, since in most human affairs the same thing is accompanied by some bad or good result, another topic consists in employing the consequence to exhort or dissuade, accuse or defend, praise or blame. For instance, education is attended by the evil of being envied, and by the good of being wise; therefore we should not be educated, for we should avoid being envied; nay rather, we should be educated, for we should be wise. This topic is identical with the Art of Callippus, when you have also included the topic of the possible and the others that have been mentioned. Cf. below, 4.
3. Aristotle, Rhetoric 2.23 1399a18-29: Another topic may be employed when it is necessary to exhort or dissuade in regard to two opposites, and one has to employ the method previously stated in the case of both. But there is this difference, that in the former case things of any kind whatever are opposed, in the latter opposites. For instance, a priestess refused to allow her son to speak in public; For if, said she, you say what is just, men will hate you; if you say what is unjust, the gods will. On the other hand, you should speak in public; for if you say what is just, the gods will love you, if you say what is unjust, men will. This is the same as the proverb, To buy the swamp with the salt; and retorting a dilemma on its proposer takes place when, two things being opposite, good and evil follow on each, the good and evil being opposite like the things themselves. This passage is so closely connected with the preceding one that it seems to have been composed by the same Callippus.
4. Aristotle, Rhetoric 2.23 1399b311400a4: Another topic common to forensic and deliberative rhetoric consists in examining what is hortatory and dissuasive, and the reasons which make men act or not. Now, these are the reasons which, if they exist, determine us to act, if not, not; for instance, if a thing is possible, easy, or useful to ourselves or our friends, or injurious and prejudicial to our enemies, or if the penalty is less than the profit. From these grounds we exhort, and dissuade from their contraries. It is on the same grounds that we accuse and defend; for what dissuades serves for defence, what persuades, for accusation. This topic comprises the whole Art of Pamphilus and Callippus. The Pamphilus cited in Quint. 3.6.34 is a different one. It is not clear who is the orator Pamphilus mentioned by Cicero (de orat. 3.21.81). Spengel on Aristotle Rhetoric p. 317 argues that this passage refers not to a written treatise by Callippus but to the tricks he employed in his speeches; his arguments for this conclusion are however extremely weak. Who would believe that such treatises as the individual sophists published always exhausted the entire art of rhetoric? On the contrary, Callippus example teaches that individual inventions were often expanded upon and illustrated by a treatise. See, besides, in which way the anonymous Ad Herennium explains the plausible (2.2.3): The plausible is that through which it is demonstrated that it was advantageous to commit a crime and that the defendant has never refrained from such shameful acts. Here there is a distinction between cause and lifestyle. The cause is what led to the misdeed through hope for advantages or avoidance of disadvantages, and in this case one asks which advantage the defendant was seeking through the misdeed, whether honor, money, or power. In these words the entire doctrine of the plausible seems to stand on Callippus teaching as though on one of the feet. You will also recognize the student of Callippus speaking when Isocrates teaches (15.217): First, one must define which goals people desire to obtain when they dare to commit evil. [因 I for my part say that they all commit all of their crimes either for pleasure or for gain or for honor. I do not see in people any desires other than these ones.
5. Philodemus, On Rhetoric: By Zeus, Demosthenes said that the first, second and third thing in rhetoric is acting. Callippides and Nicostratus I shall say [claim that it is?] all in tragedy
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