丁香园AV

Philospohy MA Student Mete H. Gencer will be giving talks at two upcoming international conferences.

The first is at the 2022 Australasian Association of Philosophy (AAP) Conference at the University of Waikato (online), June 28, 29, 30 & July 5, 6, 7, 2022.

Title: "The Paradox of Moral Queerness: Reconstructing Mackie's Queerness Argument"

Abstract: In his Ethics, J. L. Mackie argues that objective values don鈥檛 exist because they are 鈥渜ueer.鈥� Despite the controversy it has stirred in metaethics, this argument is notoriously difficult to understand. Specifically, we need to answer two hard questions to understand the argument. What is it that Mackie finds 鈥渜ueer鈥� about objective values? And how does he infer that 鈥榦bjective values don鈥檛 exist鈥� from that 鈥榦bjective values are queer鈥�? These questions are hard because they have no clear answers in Ethics. The interpretive challenge, then, is to answer them clearly. In this paper, I undertake this challenge by offering a novel reading of Mackie鈥檚 metaphysical queerness argument. On this reading, objective values are 鈥渜ueer鈥� because they prescribe actions that are metaphysically impossible for agents to do. I argue that this reading captures the essence of Mackie鈥檚 worry: our deepest moral commitments require both that objective values are 鈥渜ueer鈥� and that they cannot be 鈥渜ueer.鈥� This leads to a paradox, the most plausible way out of which is to concede that there are no objective values. Finally, I argue that my reading has the virtue of being consistent with other prominent readings in the literature while having substantial advantages over them.

The second is at SOPhiA 2022, the Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy (hybrid), September 7-9, 2022

Title: "On the Belief Condition in Thomas Reid鈥檚 Theory of Action"

Abstract: One peculiar implication of Thomas Reid鈥檚 theory of action is a belief condition: one can only do what one believes one can do. The peculiarity is that while Reid is a staunch defender of common sense, this belief condition runs afoul of common sense. We sometimes succeed in doing things without believing that we can. This raises an interpretive challenge in the form of two questions. Why does Reid let his theory of action imply such a belief condition? And does Reid鈥檚 theory of action need the belief condition? In this paper, I argue for a reading of Reid that answers these two questions. On this reading, Reid allows his theory of action to imply the belief condition because he has certain epistemic and moral goals. However, Reid doesn鈥檛 need to achieve these goals to establish his theory of action. Interestingly, Reid鈥檚 views on action are logically independent of his belief condition.