Summer 2019 Colloquium - May 24
William Taschek, The Ohio State University :: Frege on The Normativity of Logic and the Individuation of Sense
Friday, May 24 2019
Abstract: My aim is to bring into contact two central commitments of Frege鈥檚 thinking. The first is his commitment to the view that nothing is relevant to the individuation of thoughts鈥攁nd so, likewise, to the individuation of the senses of subsentential expressions鈥攅xcept, as he often puts it, what is 鈥渙f concern to logic鈥�. But for this to be very illuminating, we need to understand just what Frege took to be 鈥渙f concern to logic鈥�. Which brings me to the second commitment鈥攏amely, Frege鈥檚 commitment to the fundamentally normative status of logic. I will argue that a proper appreciation of the fundamentally normative status that logic has for Frege can provide significant insight into what Frege took to be 鈥渙f concern to logic鈥� in a way that will, in turn, shed light on how he understood the individuation of thought鈥攁nd, so, of sense more generally. I will propose a criterion for thought identity that Frege would endorse. I will then test this proposal by how well it allows us to make sense of some notoriously puzzling remarks that Frege makes late in his career about what he calls equipollent sentences.
Talks are held at the Burnaby Campus in room WMC3510 from 3:30 - 5:00 p.m., unless otherwise indicated. They are free and open to the public.