Spring 2019 Colloquium Series - 15 March
Andrew Chignell, Princeton :: Knowledge and Ignorance in Kant
Abstract: At some point during the 鈥渟ilent decade鈥� leading up to the publication of the first Critique, Kant came to think that a necessary condition on cognizing a proposition is that we be in a position to establish that the items it refers to are 鈥渞eally possible鈥� or 鈥渞eally impossible.鈥� Substantive claims about the positive features of individual things-in-themselves, in turns out, cannot meet this condition, and this (I argue) is what motivates Kant鈥檚 famous 鈥渘oumenal ignorance鈥� doctrine. Here I discuss the condition in detail, Kant鈥檚 central arguments for it, and why it should be regarded, in contemporary terms, as a broadly coherentist constraint on substantive knowledge.
Talks are held at the Burnaby Campus in room WMC 3510 from 3:30 - 5:00 p.m., unless otherwise indicated. They are free and open to the public.