ࡱ> kmjM ybjbj== WWVl lL(8```t84t22"TTTTTTfhhhhhh$ !`TTTTTv``TTvvvT`T`TfvTfv vf``fT& t2Nff0fq"q"fvtt````A Common Sense Vision for Canada Employment Insurance Before the Government of Canada created its universal unemployment insurance program in 1940, workers protected themselves from the adverse consequences of losing their jobs by a variety of means. They self-insured by accumulating savings. They shared the risks with other workers by belonging to workers clubs that helped its members during financial emergencies in return for dues, which in a sense were equivalent to insurance premiums. They shared the risks more widely with the community by belonging to religious congregations, service clubs and neighborhood organizations, which were financed by more or less voluntary contributions from members. In the light of problems associated with Canadas current employment insurance program, it is important to note that these private insurance systems imposed strict limits on the ability of workers to cheat outright or change their behavior in such a way that they became unemployed more often and remained in this state longer than if they had not protected themselves against the adverse consequences of unemployment. If they quit or caused the loss of their jobs, it cost them their own savings. If they shared the risk with others, the intimate personal relationships in these organizations assured that their behavior was known and they faced the loss of benefits. Similar consequences arose if they did not search new jobs intensively, refused to accept jobs they were offered or refused to move to different locations for employment. It is clear also that the purely private employment insurance system did not lead to implicit subsidies from people, firms, industries and regions with stable employment records to those with records of instability. As will be seen below, such subsidies increase Canadas average unemployment rates and cause serious inefficiencies and therefore lower real incomes. The Promises of Public Employment Insurance The government-financed and -operated employment insurance system in Canada was put into place during an age when there was much optimism about the ability of governments to increase the welfare of its citizens through universal schemes of social insurance. The high unemployment rates during the Great Depression of the 1930s caused problems for workers that the traditional system could not cope with. Welfare improvements were expected to arise from the elimination of the need of individual workers to save for rainy days and to submit to the codes of behavior of religious and other voluntary organizations they were forced to join if they wanted protection from the consequences of unemployment. The larger the base of insured workers, the more the system spreads the risk and lowers the cost of providing protection. In the spirit of the times it was also considered fair that those in industries and regions with more stable employment and higher incomes should in effect help those in industries and regions with less stable employment and lower incomes. For these reasons, the federal rather than the provincial government operated the system. Labor market efficiency was expected to increase as unemployed workers could afford to hold out longer for better jobs and thus face lower risk of unemployment later. Finally, the system was expected to stabilize aggregate demand and thus reduce the frequency and size of business cycles and unemployment. All of these benefits were considered to be an increasing function of the size of the benefits provided. For this reason, the federal system provided workers with more generous benefits than had been available under the private system. The scheme was financed by a payroll tax that was quite low initially but rose through time. To stabilize aggregate demand, the system was expected to run a surplus during booms large enough to finance deficits during recessions, leaving no surpluses or deficits over the business cycle. The payroll tax was applied to a relatively low level of earnings only, which would have made it regressive were it not for the fact that high-income earners were expected to draw on benefits relatively rarely. The tax was also applied uniformly on workers from all industries, regardless of the relative frequency of their demand for benefits. This latter provision has turned out to cause major economic inefficiencies. Problems with the System Personal Behavior and the Incidence of Unemployment The public employment insurance scheme has delivered on the most obvious promises affecting individual workers. Dependence on and the need to accumulate savings were diminished. The personal pressures by members of voluntary organizations to behave in the labor market according to accepted social norms were decreased. Industries and regions with high incidence of unemployment were subsidized by the rest of Canadas industries and regions. The scheme resulted in greater equality of after tax and subsidy income of Canadians. The system after its creation in 1941 was only moderately generous and in many ways equal to that in the United States. The unemployment rates in Canada and the United States were nearly identical for nearly 50 years. However until in 1971 Canadas system became more generous and broadened to provide other social insurance objectives. The level of benefits relative to wages was raised, eligibility was established for occupations like fishermen, the length of time required to establish rights to benefits was shortened, the time over which benefits can be received was lengthened and benefits were raised for workers in regions with high unemployment rates relative to those available in the rest of the country. After the 1971 reforms workers, employers in the private and public sectors gradually learned how to take advantage of the new conditions while global turmoil in the wake of oil price increases and high inflation distorted traditional relationships. As a result, Canadian and US unemployment rates remained nearly equal until 1982, when the learning process and the special influences had been completed and the Canadian unemployment rate rose substantially above the US rate. This gap has remained since. Part of the upward trend in Canadas unemployment rate through time is attributable to some sociological developments. Public attitudes about receiving benefits changed. It no longer carried a stigma but had become a right of citizenship and justifiable as a return on premiums paid. Bureaucrats took the place of friends and other close associates who under the private system limited the ability of workers to cheat. Bureaucrats did not have the knowledge, skills or resources to assess the validity of claims for benefits in the traditional way. In fact, the incentives of these public servants were to avoid confrontation with claimants that would get themselves and their political bosses in trouble with the media and public by denying a claim that seemed questionable but turned out to be legitimate. So instead, they became increasingly willing to accept claims for benefits on the basis of limited evidence on lay-offs (rather than quits), job search and willingness to change occupations and job locations. Another part of the increased level of unemployment is attributable to adjustments in the behavior of workers, employers and governments. In order to qualify for benefits, workers always have had to present to the systems administrators documents that showed their employer laid them off and were not unemployed because they quit their job. In fact, virtually all of the unemployed were certified as involuntary, even if they quit voluntarily or provoked the employer deliberately into firing them for absenteeism or insubordination. The reason that employers rarely refused to issue lay-off certificates is that it was costless to do so and enhanced their reputation as good employers in the labor market. The availability of public insurance benefits increased the number of persons that joined the labor force for the express purpose of working just long enough to qualify for benefits and collecting them for as long as the law allowed. This practice is a rational response of Canadians to a set of opportunities created by the government. The benefits increased the effective pay received for the limited time of work. Persons who at the normal hourly wage would not have found it worth their while to give up leisure and other non-market activities, at the wage rate inflated by the insurance benefits found it worthwhile to join the labor force. Bureaucrats were unable to stop this exploitation of the system since it is virtually impossible to ascertain whether the recipients of benefits have a genuine attachment to the labor force and are actively looking for jobs. The net effect of the conditions created by the public employment insurance schemes just described has been an increase in unemployment due to increased layoffs, longer job search and increased labor market participation. Numerous studies have shown that the resultant increase in the unemployment rates are an increasing function of the level of benefits relative to wages (the replacement ratio) and the length over which benefits are available while they become higher the shorter is the time of work required to qualify for benefits. The empirical evidence draws heavily on comparisons with conditions in the United States, where these determinants of the unemployment rate just noted remained more or less unchanged at a time when Canadian conditions become more generous. Thus, between 1947 and 1981 Canadas average unemployment rates were slightly lower than the US rates. After the increased generosity took full effect in 1982, by 2003 the average Canadian had exceeded the average US rates by 3.2 percent. If in 2003 the Canadian rate had equaled the of the United States, the employment insurance system would have paid $5.5 billion less in benefits that year alone. If Canadas extra-unemployed workers had been employed, they would have added $22 billion to output and caused profits and government taxes to be higher by corresponding amounts. In response to these developments, since 1990 the Government of Canada has gradually reduced the systems generosity to the point where in recent years it had returned to the pre-1971 levels and had become nearly equal to the generosity of the US system. However, the lower levels of generosity have not closed the gap between Canadian and US unemployment rates. One reason is that the public attitudes towards the receipt of unemployment insurance benefits had changed permanently. The receipt of these benefits is a right and there is not stigma attached to taking advantage of any opportunities offered by the system to obtain these benefits. It is doubtful that public attitudes in this respect will ever change back to those existing in the absence of the public insurance system. Subsidies of Industries and Regions The second reason why Canadas system of employment insurance has resulted in higher unemployment rates than exist in the United States is the absence of experience rating in the setting of premium rates. Such experience rating forces firms or industries and their workers to pay higher premiums into the system the greater is the incidence of claims on benefits made by such workers. In the absence of such ratings workers in construction, forestry, agriculture and fishing collectively receive employment insurance benefits that in total exceed by several multiples the premiums they pay into the system. The same holds for workers in economically depressed regions like the Atlantic Provinces and others where employment in such industries is dominant. Four main reasons for the existence of the higher unemployment rates in these industries and regions have been identified. First, workers who have tended to move to other employment when they lost their seasonal employment, no longer have to do so. Second, employers in these industries and regions can get employees to do seasonal work at lower pay than they could before they received benefits automatically during the rest of the year. Third, the large Canadian automobile industry has regular annual plant closings for maintenance and model changes. Workers in that industry receive unemployment insurance benefits during this period. Fourth, particularly in the Atlantic region provincial governments have adopted a system under which public sector workers are employed for just enough time to qualify for benefits before they were laid off and replaced by new workers and so on in rotation around the year. This system encouraged a flourishing underground economy operated by workers receiving benefits. The effects of these incentives for the overexpansion of seasonal industries and some regions are not just higher recorded unemployment, which represents a waste of human resources by itself. Other costs are that the patterns of migration by workers from economically depressed into booming regions were disrupted. In the Atlantic Provinces the wage rates private sector employers could afford to pay often were too low to attract workers who benefited from the government-sponsored job rotation scheme just described and work in the underground economy. The technology chosen by the firms in the seasonal industries took advantage of the relatively low wages and was less laborsaving than it would have been otherwise. The payroll tax used to finance the employment insurance had to be collected at a higher rate in non-seasonal industries, inducing inefficiencies in these industries. All of these and other effects of the existing employment insurance system caused inefficiencies in the allocation of resources, dampened economic growth and lowered real incomes of all Canadians. In 1995 the Canadian system was subjected to some highly publicized reforms, including the change of the systems name from unemployment to employment insurance. The most important of these reforms involved the creation of a new form of experience rating. Employers and workers in industries with seasonal employment were not required to pay higher premiums, as is the case in the United States. Instead, certain classes of workers saw their eligibility for benefits reduced. For example, workers with annual incomes over $100 thousand were ineligible for benefits if they claimed them for more than a specific number of years. These rules affected mainly fishermen and automobile workers. Under political pressures from the affected individuals, firms and regions and an electoral setback for the Liberal party in the 1997 election in the Atlantic Provinces, this experiment with the new experience ratings was abruptly cancelled. No studies of the effects of the new rules on unemployment have been published but the existence of the political pressures suggests that they were significant. The Financial Surpluses and Other Social Benefits The principle used in financing Canadas employment insurance system was inspired by Keynesian economics: During economic booms reduce aggregate demand by taxing the public by more than is needed to finance the benefit payments over the same time period. During recessions increase aggregate demand by collecting fewer taxes than are needed to pay for the benefits, drawing down the funds accumulated during the boom. The apparently simple principle has proven difficult to put into practice. The timing and size of booms and recessions are unknown. Sine the 1971 reforms and especially the 1995 shift of the responsibility for rate setting to the Minister of Industry and Human Resources Development mentioned above, the system has developed large surpluses. Rate increases in 1993 aimed at the elimination of a deficit by 1995 had begun to generate surpluses that had cumulated to $45 billion in 2004, enough to pay annual benefits for 3 years even if no additional premium income were received. Minor reductions in premium rates since 1995 have obviously been insufficient to restore the systems fiscal balance. Annual surpluses are projected to continue at the rate of about $3 billion a year. These surpluses of the employment insurance system appear as general revenue in the federal governments fiscal accounts and have contributed significantly to recent surpluses. This record of large and persistent surpluses is partly due to the unpredictability of economic cycles but it is mainly the offspring of politics. Politicians like to spend money on projects that increase their election chances, especially so if they can be financed through revenue increases that do not require them to vote for higher taxes. The large surpluses of the employment insurance system just described led politicians to create a number of new special spending programs. Thus, Canadian workers were given the right to remain away from work with full pay under special circumstances. One of these involves mothers giving birth or adopting a child and fathers to help with parenting during some weeks after the birth. While the owners and operators of small and professional businesses are not eligible for employment insurance benefits, self-employed owners of fishing businesses are. Workers engaged in formal agreements to share existing jobs are eligible for benefits while they do not work. The latest program allows workers paid compassionate leave if they are needed to care for terminally ill relatives. These programs are financed explicitly out of employment insurance funds, which would otherwise have shown even larger surpluses. In addition, since the funds surpluses have been reported in Federal budgets as part of general revenues and thus added to fiscal surpluses, they have encouraged higher overall spending unaccompanied by the need to raise taxes correspondingly. There are two important issues surrounding the accumulation of excessive funds by the employment insurance system. First, the process used in the adoption of the social benefits financed with the surpluses lacks transparency. They have nothing to do with unemployment and instead should explicitly be part of Canadas general social benefit program. The need for these programs and provisions for financing them should have been discussed together in parliament and in the context of the entire fabric of social benefits. Second, these social spending programs encroach on the jurisdiction of provinces that under Canadas constitution are responsible for welfare programs. Their existence thus represents a serious encroachment of federal into provincial areas of jurisdiction that is not only unconstitutional but also prevents Canadians from selecting social programs that best suit their conditions and preferences at levels where politicians are closest to their constituencies. Summary and Conclusions The operation of Canadas public insurance system has imposed considerable costs on the economy and therefore the average Canadian family. The higher unemployment means that more workers are idle on average through the year that otherwise would have produced more output, increased the tax base and allowed lower tax rates or more government spending. The higher unemployment rates were caused in part by changes in workers behavior as they respond to incentives created by the system. In addition, higher unemployment rates were caused by subsidies to firms, industries and regions with seasonally unstable employment. The failure to adjust premium rates resulted in the creation of an excessively large fund of the systems reserves. These surpluses contributed to the creation of social programs that are unrelated to the problem of unemployment and that encroach on provincial responsibilities. Common Sense Vision Policy Changes The following common sense policy changes are suggested by the preceding analysis. Personal Behavior and the Incidence of Unemployment The system should be modified to restore a part of the incentives that existed before, when decisions to join the work force, efforts to find new jobs and provoke layoffs impinged directly on the private resources of workers. For this purpose, consideration should be given to further reductions in the generosity of the conditions system in terms of qualifying times and levels of benefits. Such considerations need to compare the needs of individual workers with the costs imposed on society as a whole. In the past, the costs to society have received less attention than they should. Consideration should also be given to a system of individual unemployment accounts. Under such a scheme, employers and workers pay premiums into an account owned by the worker and portable between jobs. The money in the account can be used only to finance the individual workers needs during periods of unemployment. It becomes freely usable when a worker retires from the labor force. The proposed new system would strongly reduce incentives that under the existing system distorts work, quit and job search behavior. Before such a system of individual unemployment accounts can be put into effect a large number of operational details need to be worked out. Some of these involve the phasing in of the new system, which might see a gradual increase in the percent of premiums going into personal accounts. Possibly, this percentage could be set permanently at one half, leaving Canada with a hybrid public and private system. It will be necessary to create protection for new entrants into the labor force that have no money in their individual accounts. Should the government remain a source of funds for workers that remain unemployed for prolonged periods and run out of money in their private accounts? What should be the tax treatment of the premiums and income earned on private accounts? Should the amounts held in private accounts be subject to upper limits? These and other issues have arisen in the context of proposals for the establishment of medical savings accounts and perform the same function as the proposed employment insurance accounts. Singapore has operated its prudential savings account system successfully for a long time. Its study offers valuable insights into the optimal design of the proposed system. Brunner and Colarelli (2004) present a detailed plan for the creation of Individual Unemployment Accounts for the United States and offer many insights useful for the design of such a system in Canada. Subsidies of Industries and Regions The economically most important proposal for reform envisages the introduction of experience rating based on either one or both of two different approaches. One of these envisages premiums that vary according to the likelihood that beneficiaries become unemployed and draw on benefits paid by the system. Industries that have large seasonal fluctuations in employment pay higher rates than industries subject only to cyclical fluctuations.  The alternative approach used in the 1995 reforms involves specifying conditions under which certain types of beneficiaries become ineligible. The experience rating of premiums would end the subsidies that under the present system of uniform premiums flow from seasonally stable to seasonally unstable industries, while retaining the protection of workers in both industries from the costs of unpredictable cyclical and structural changes in output and demand for labor. The stable industries would enjoy reductions in their implicit tax burden and expand their operations. The seasonally unstable industries in turn would lose the subsidies implicit in the present system. Regions that differ according to the prevalence of seasonal industries would correspondingly expand or contract. As a result, Canadas average unemployment rate would fall, economic efficiency would increase and national income and tax revenues would grow correspondingly. Eliminating Excess Reserves The existing system used to determine premium rates through time should be changed to prevent the excessive growth of reserves and their use for other social programs. This change requires three separate innovations. First, the setting of premiums must be removed from political influence. This means removing the authority from the Minister of Industry and Human Resources Development into a commission free from political influence. The setting of premiums according to a formula that assures that the system operates with an efficient level of reserves should not be beyond the capability of economists and actuaries. Second, the reserves should be segregated from general federal tax revenues and should be unavailable to finance general government spending. A way must be found to return at least part of the recent surpluses to the system so that premiums could be lowered correspondingly. Third, the social programs like parental and compassionate leave that burden the employment insurance system should be made the responsibility of the provinces, which need to finance them out of their own revenues and set eligibility conditions appropriate for political and social conditions in their own jurisdictions. References Axworthy, Thomas (2004), High payroll taxes are a scandal, National Post, March 10, p. A14 Brunner, Lawrence and Stephen Colarelli (2004), Individual Employment Accounts, The Independent Review, VII, 4, Spring Clemens, Jason and Sylvia LeRoy (2004), CSV module on need to keep welfare programs now provide by the unemployment insurance system under the jurisdiction of the provinces Commission of Inquiry on Unemployment Insurance REPORT (Forget Commission Report) (1986), Ministry of Supply and Services Canada Green, Christopher, Fred Lazar, Miles Corak and Dominique Gross (1994), Unemployment Insurance: How to Make it Work, Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute Grubel, Herbert (2004), The Cost of Canadas Employment Insurance System, Fraser Forum, February, pp. 8-9 -------------------, Dennis Maki and Shelley Sax (1975), Real and Insurance-Induced Unemployment in Canada, Canadian Journal of Economics, VII,(2), May, 174-91 ------------------ and Michael Walker, editors (1978), Unemployment Insurance: Global Evidence of its Effect on Unemployment, Vancouver: Fraser Institute Kesselman, Jonathan (1983), Financing Canadian Unemployment Insurance, Canadian Tax Paper No 73, Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation ------------------------- (2004), Tax Design for a Northern Tiger, a monograph in the series Choices: Economic Policy and Growth, published by the Institute for Research in Public Policy, Vol. 10, No.1, March McArthur, William, Cynthia Ramsay with Michael Walker editors (1996), Healthy Incentives: Canadian Health Reform in an International Context, Vancouver, BC: The Fraser Institute McMahon, Fred (1996), Looking the Gift Horse in the Mouth: Then Impact of Federal Transfers on Atlantic Canada, Halifax, NS: Atlantic Institute for Market Studies ------------------ (2000), Retreat from Growth: Atlantic Canada and the Negative-Sum Economy, Halifax, NS: Atlantic Institute for Market Studies Nakamura, Alice and Erwin Diewert (2004), Why we need a return to Experience Rating in EI, Fraser Forum, February, pp. 10-12 Sandhu, Kernial and Paul Wheatley, editors (1989), Management of Success: The Moulding of Modern Singapore, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Herbert Grubel, Senior Fellow, The Fraser Institute and Professor of Economics (Emeritus), ԰AV Draft of April 7, 2004. Word count: 4,200 including footnotes and references.  The author gratefully acknowledges comments on an earlier draft made by Jonathan Kesselman, Dennis Maki and Alice Nakamura.  For further discussion of these simple calculations see Grubel (2004).  For a discussion of the problems with Canadas employment insurance system in all respects see the thorough and scholarly Commission of InquiryThe Forget Commission Report (1986). Evidence of the effects of unemployment insurance on the unemployment rate is found in Grubel, Maki and Sax (1975) for Canada and Grubel and Walker (1978) for other industrial countries. The system is analyzed critically and suggestions for reform are found in Green et. al. (1994).  A case study of these effects on the economy of the Atlantic Provinces is found in McMahon (1996), (2000). Nakamura and Diewert (2004) discuss the cost of uniform insurance premiums and references to numerous academic studies and government reports of problems with the present system.  In economic and legal terminology, insurance is taken out for protection against specified hazards. Thus, we buy Automobile accident and theft insurance and Home fire and burglary insurance. The terms car insurance and home insurance are used widely and conveniently in popular discourse, but such imprecise terminology should not be used to describe government policies. Besides, the initial name has existed for over 50 years and the new one makes Canada the only country in the OECD to use this terminology. Any major reform in the future should restore the old name.  These data are from Axworthy (2004), who argues that the premiums are a payroll tax and thus a tax on labor, which like all payroll taxes causes serious inefficiencies in the labor market.  The political independence of the Unemployment Insurance Commission was compromised when the 1995 reforms to the system moved responsibility for the setting of premiums to the Minister of Industry and Human resources. This move has exposed the rate setting process to many strong political pressures unrelated to the efficient and equitable operation of the unemployment insurance system.  For more on the subject of this section see Clemens and LeRoy (2004)  See McArthur, Ramsay and Walker (1966).  Sandhu and Wheatley (1989) contains discussions of the Singapore system.  A detailed exposition of the system and its many facets is found in Kesselman (1983).  See Nakamura and Diewert (2004). 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