SFU Philosophy Faculty Research Summaries

Kathleen Akins

Areas of Interest

I am interested in virtually all issues in the philosophy of mind as well as the metaphysical and epistemic problems they engender—from the nature of mental representation and intentionality, to colour perception, embedded cognition, cognitive development, the emotions, consciousness and the self. What unifies all of these investigations is a neuro-philosophical approach. I begin any project with the problem as traditionally conceived by philosophy; then I look at what recent neuroscience has unearthed on the topic. The task is then to use the empirical literature to reconceive of the traditional philosophical problem while at the same time using the philosophical insights to drive forward the experiments in neuroscience. I regard my work as essentially int

philosophy of mind/psychology and language/linguistics. But I am now about at last SSHRC supported project entitled “The Epistemology of Social Prejudice,” which I hope will result in a book manuscript over the next couple of years. Additionally, I have done a fair amount of work in political philosophy, and occasionally dabble in the odd bit of history. I teach and supervise across all these areas.

PERSONAL SITE: http://endrebegby.synthasite.com/

Sam Black

Areas of Interest

Social and Political Philosophy, Ethics, History of 17th Century Philosophy

Current Research Projects

I began my career in political philosophy examining the relationship between individual and group rights. Since then, my interests have come to embrace more foundational questions in social philosophy. The projects on which I am currently working include: (1) the place of skepticism in an adequate theory of public reason, (2) the historical role that skepticism played in the development of seventeenth century moral and political philosophy, and (3) a book length manuscript that defends an account of reasons to be moral.

Philosophy of Mind and Language
Philosophy in Film

Current Research Projects

My current research centres on issues in practical reason and moral agency. Regarding the former, I am specifically interested in the nature and ground of normative force, both from a historical and contemporary perspective. It is increasingly common in the contemporary literature to treat reasons as normatively and conceptually primitive. But even if this kind of primitivism is true, there remain important and interesting questions concerning the kind of normative force that reasons are supposed to have.a5 nl a re 6.3 (at)i-32.3 (w.3 (